CARME - Comunicações em conferências com publicação em atas
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Browsing CARME - Comunicações em conferências com publicação em atas by Author "Botelho, Anabela"
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- Diferentes métodos de distribuição inicial dos direitos de emissão de CO2 na União Europeia : impacto sobre a eficiênciaPublication . Fernandes, Maria Eduarda; Botelho, Anabela; Pinto, LígiaPara lidar com o problema das alterações climáticas globais a escolha tem recaído, sobretudo, em instrumentos de política ambiental baseados no funcionamento do mercado. O Protocolo de Quioto e o mercado europeu para transacção de direitos de emissão de CO2 (EU ETS – European Union Emissions Trading Scheme) são exemplos claros dessa mesma opção. Tendo em conta a sua importância e carácter inovador como política de combate a uma externalidade negativa ao nível global, um conhecimento mais profundo deste instrumento de política é essencial (...)
- Do emission permits markets' original advantages still hold?Publication . Fernandes, Maria Eduarda; Pinto, Lígia; Botelho, AnabelaEmission permits markets have been implemented all over the world but in very different conditions than those assumed in the original models developed by Dales (1968) or Montgomery (1972). This paper summarizes the assumptions that are violated when implementing this policy instrument. Reviewing the most significant literature in the area, we analyse the consequences of these violations for the outcome of emission permits markets, and derive conclusions about whether the traditional advantages associated with this instrument still hold. The major solutions that have been suggested for the identified market failures are also described. We find that despite the conflicting results reported in the literature, there are some conclusions unanimously accepted. Importantly, we find that the characteristics of market institutions are significant determinants of the outcome of these markets, which means that these aspects may no longer be treated as a mere detail as within the neoclassical approach. In addition, we find that these characteristics have important impacts on many other “market failures” identified in this paper. Since these aspects were not included in the original models, their predictions differ from the results effectively achieved with the implementation of an emissions permit market.
- European Union's CO2 emission permits market : an experimental studyPublication . Fernandes, Maria Eduarda; Pinto, Lígia; Botelho, AnabelaGlobal warming is a major issue on international political agendas regardless of the uncertainties and divergences still remaining on the real dimension of the problem. Scientific community disagreement on its true consequences for human life is even bigger but public opinion urges for action. Anthropogenic greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions became the target and its mitigation compulsory, as they are pointed as key responsible for the sudden and severe global climate change we are facing. Therefore, to choose the best policy instrument to achieve this environmental goal while minimizing the consequences for economies competitiveness is a crucial task (...)
- Grandfathering vs. auctioning in the EU ETS : an experimental studyPublication . Botelho, Anabela; Fernandes, Maria Eduarda; Pinto, LígiaThe present paper is the first to simultaneously include rules and parameters that try to parallel the EU ETS in the laboratory. To study the adequacy of the institution chosen for the EU ETS is our goal as well as testing the impact of changing the initial allocation rule: auctioning instead of grandfathering, in two different experimental treatments. The use of auctions as a rule for the initial allocation method for CO2 emission permits, in the next stages of the EU ETS (European Union Emissions Trading Scheme) is a subject the European Commission and its Member-States are currently discussing and evaluating. This paper is the first to experimentally test the Ausubel (2004) auction for the case of CO2 emission permits in the EU ETS, a theoretically efficient dynamic design for multiple units with results equivalent to the Vickrey auction. Our experimental results suggest that the Ausubel auction does not allocate CO2 emission permits efficiently but at the end total abatement cost minimization is still achieved in the auctioning treatment. The importance of the secondary market, and its functioning rules, is highlighted in this experimental treatment. Moreover, we conclude efficiency is the same whether emission permits are initially auctioned or grandfathered.