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Relação entre a estrutura de capital e corporate governance
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O presente estudo visa analisar a relação entre a estrutura de capital e os mecanismos de
corporate governance. Para tal foi analisada uma amostra de dados em painel de 37 empresas
cotadas em Portugal e Espanha, entre os anos de 2014 e 2023.
A estrutura de capital foi medida por várias proxies de endividamento: total, de curto prazo,
de médio e longo prazo e endividamento via fornecedores (também referido na literatura
como crédito comercial), calculada por medidas contabilísticas e de mercado. Como
mecanismos de corporate governance foram considerados a dimensão do conselho de
administração, a independência do conselho, a dualidade de funções do CEO (Chief
Executive Officer), a diversidade de género no conselho e a existência de conselho de
auditoria. Foram ainda incluídas variáveis de controlo de natureza económico-financeira
(dimensão da empresa, tangibilidade, rendibilidade, idade) e macroeconómica (crescimento
do Produto Interno Bruto (PIB), taxa de inflação e taxa média de endividamento público em
relação ao PIB). Os modelos foram estimados através de modelos de efeitos fixos e efeitos
aleatórios.
Os resultados evidenciam que diferentes mecanismos de corporate governance influenciam
de forma distinta o endividamento das empresas, dependendo do tipo de proxy de
endividamento analisada. Em particular, a concentração dos cargos de CEO e presidente do
conselho de administração numa pessoa, e a existência de conselho de auditoria contribuem
para diminuir o endividamento via fornecedores, enquanto a presenças de mulheres nos
conselhos de administração contribui para aumentar o endividamento total e de médio e
longo prazo. Relativamente às variáveis de controlo, têm um impacto diferenciado consoante
a proxy de endividamento analisada, sendo os resultados globalmente consistentes com as
teorias tradicionais de estrutura de capital, nomeadamente a teoria da agência, o trade-off e
a pecking order theory.
Estes insights são relevantes para diferentes stakeholders: para investidores, oferecem
indicações sobre como os mecanismos de governação podem reduzir riscos associados a
níveis excessivos de endividamento; para gestores, demonstram que a composição e
funcionamento do conselho podem ser utilizados como instrumentos estratégicos na
definição da estrutura de capital; para reguladores, evidenciam a importância de promover práticas de governance robustas, como forma de reforçar a estabilidade financeira e aumentar
a confiança nos mercados.
This study aims to analyze the relationship between capital structure and corporate governance mechanisms. To this end, a panel data sample of 37 companies listed in Portugal and Spain between 2014 and 2023 was analyzed. Capital structure was measured by several debt proxies: total, short-term, medium-term, and long-term debt, and supplier debt (also referred to in the literature as trade credit), calculated using accounting and market measures. Corporate governance mechanisms considered included the size of the board of directors, board independence, dual roles of the CEO (Chief Executive Officer), gender diversity on the board, and the existence of an audit committee. Control variables of an economic-financial nature (company size, tangibility, profitability, age) and macroeconomic nature (growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), inflation rate, and average public debt-to-GDP ratio) were also included. The models were estimated using fixed effects and random effects models. The results show that different corporate governance mechanisms influence corporate debt differently, depending on the type of debt proxy analyzed. In particular, the concentration of the positions of CEO and chairman of the board of directors in one person, and the existence of an audit committee contribute to reducing indebtedness via suppliers, while the presence of women on boards of directors contributes to increasing total and medium- and long-term indebtedness. Control variables have a different impact depending on the debt proxy analyzed, with results broadly consistent with traditional capital structure theories, namely agency theory, trade-off theory, and pecking order theory. These insights are relevant to different stakeholders: for investors, they offer indications on how governance mechanisms can reduce risks associated with excessive levels of debt; for managers, they demonstrate that the composition and functioning of the board can be used as strategic instruments in defining the capital structure; for regulators, they highlight the importance of promoting robust governance practices as a way to strengthen financial stability and increase confidence in the markets.
This study aims to analyze the relationship between capital structure and corporate governance mechanisms. To this end, a panel data sample of 37 companies listed in Portugal and Spain between 2014 and 2023 was analyzed. Capital structure was measured by several debt proxies: total, short-term, medium-term, and long-term debt, and supplier debt (also referred to in the literature as trade credit), calculated using accounting and market measures. Corporate governance mechanisms considered included the size of the board of directors, board independence, dual roles of the CEO (Chief Executive Officer), gender diversity on the board, and the existence of an audit committee. Control variables of an economic-financial nature (company size, tangibility, profitability, age) and macroeconomic nature (growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), inflation rate, and average public debt-to-GDP ratio) were also included. The models were estimated using fixed effects and random effects models. The results show that different corporate governance mechanisms influence corporate debt differently, depending on the type of debt proxy analyzed. In particular, the concentration of the positions of CEO and chairman of the board of directors in one person, and the existence of an audit committee contribute to reducing indebtedness via suppliers, while the presence of women on boards of directors contributes to increasing total and medium- and long-term indebtedness. Control variables have a different impact depending on the debt proxy analyzed, with results broadly consistent with traditional capital structure theories, namely agency theory, trade-off theory, and pecking order theory. These insights are relevant to different stakeholders: for investors, they offer indications on how governance mechanisms can reduce risks associated with excessive levels of debt; for managers, they demonstrate that the composition and functioning of the board can be used as strategic instruments in defining the capital structure; for regulators, they highlight the importance of promoting robust governance practices as a way to strengthen financial stability and increase confidence in the markets.
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Corporate governance Estrutura de capital Endividamento Conselho de Administração Diversidade de género Empresas cotadas Portugal Espanha