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What you get is not what you paid for: New evidence from a lab experiment on negative externalities and information asymmetries

dc.contributor.authorFernandes, Maria Eduarda
dc.contributor.authorValente, Marieta
dc.date.accessioned2021-07-05T14:35:17Z
dc.date.available2021-07-05T14:35:17Z
dc.date.issued2021-05-13
dc.description.abstractIn markets where ethical goods are available, consumers and producers can voluntarily address the negative externality market failure. However, in reality, these goods are often credence goods and the claims are not verifiable by consumers. We design an experiment to explore whether there can be voluntary internalization of negative externalities in markets controlling for different types of information asymmetry, namely credence claims with the potential for false advertisements, the possibility of certifying claims and finally mandatory truthful claims. We observe that there is a limited scope for ethical goods to be traded and negative externalities reduced in all informational setups. However, when false claims can be made, markets will appear very prosocial to the outside observer who will see widespread concerns for externalities and a price premium on allegedly ethical goods relative to conventional ones. In fact, conventional goods are just being falsely advertised as ethical. In addition, the price premium is seldom enough to cover the additional cost of producing a good that minimizes externalities. Even when credence claims are not allowed, the market will only partially internalize negative externalities, leaving thus room for some form of regulatory intervention.pt_PT
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionpt_PT
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.socec.2021.101712pt_PT
dc.identifier.issn2214-8043
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.8/5863
dc.language.isoengpt_PT
dc.peerreviewedyespt_PT
dc.relationCentre of Applied Research in Management and Economics
dc.relationCentre for Research in Economics and Management
dc.subjectCredence goodspt_PT
dc.subjectNegative externalitiespt_PT
dc.subjectEthical goodspt_PT
dc.subjectFalse adspt_PT
dc.subjectLabelspt_PT
dc.subjectEconomic experimentpt_PT
dc.titleWhat you get is not what you paid for: New evidence from a lab experiment on negative externalities and information asymmetriespt_PT
dc.typejournal article
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.awardTitleCentre of Applied Research in Management and Economics
oaire.awardTitleCentre for Research in Economics and Management
oaire.awardURIinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/FCT/6817 - DCRRNI ID/UIDB%2F04928%2F2020/PT
oaire.awardURIinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/FCT/6817 - DCRRNI ID/UIDB%2F03182%2F2020/PT
oaire.citation.startPage101712pt_PT
oaire.citation.titleJournal of Behavioral and Experimental Economicspt_PT
oaire.citation.volume93pt_PT
oaire.fundingStream6817 - DCRRNI ID
oaire.fundingStream6817 - DCRRNI ID
person.familyNameFernandes
person.familyNameValente
person.givenNameMaria Eduarda
person.givenNameMarieta
person.identifier.ciencia-idAC13-ED97-A1C0
person.identifier.ciencia-id511B-769F-33DF
person.identifier.orcid0000-0001-6584-0412
person.identifier.orcid0000-0003-3332-8945
person.identifier.scopus-author-id57191744568
project.funder.identifierhttp://doi.org/10.13039/501100001871
project.funder.identifierhttp://doi.org/10.13039/501100001871
project.funder.nameFundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
project.funder.nameFundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
rcaap.rightsclosedAccesspt_PT
rcaap.typearticlept_PT
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relation.isAuthorOfPublication8278dcd3-15ea-4abe-819f-4cd116b70ca1
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery4db6bf33-8fbf-43c5-b14c-75a606ad8783
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