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Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
We verify through numerical simulations that the influence
of the update dynamics on the evolution of cooperation in the Snowdrift
game is closely related to the number of strategy exchanges between
agents. The results show that strategy exchanges contribute to
the destruction of compact clusters favorable to cooperator agents. In
general, strategy exchanges decrease as the synchrony rate decreases.
This explains why smaller synchrony rates are beneficial to cooperators
in situations where a large number of exchanges occur with synchronous
updating. On the other hand, this is coherent with the fact that the
Snowdrift game is completely insensitive to the synchrony rate when the
replicator dynamics transition rule is used: there are almost no strategy
exchanges when this rule is used.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Evolution of cooperation Update dynamics Asynchronism
Contexto Educativo
Citação
Grilo, Carlos; Correia, Luís. 2009. "Update Dynamics, Strategy Exchanges and the Evolution of Cooperation in the Snowdrift game", Trabalho apresentado em 10th European Conference on Artifical Life, ECAL 2009, In Advances in Artificial Life. Darwin Meets von Neumann - Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Budapeste.
