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A Repeated Strategy for Dumping

dc.contributor.authorMartins, José
dc.contributor.authorBanik, N.
dc.contributor.authorPinto, Alberto A.
dc.date.accessioned2025-07-17T14:44:25Z
dc.date.available2025-07-17T14:44:25Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.description.abstractIn this work, we study the phenomena of dumping in a duopoly market through an infinitely repeated game. We consider two firms of different countries competing in the same country. When both firms are cooperating, if the foreign firm deviates from cooperation this can be interpreted as dumping and a period of punishment can be imposed to the foreign firm. After this, firms can play continuously the deviation-punishment game or compete à la Cournot. Previously, we observe that the repeated strategy of deviation-punishment is not adopted in the case of symmetric demand equations. Here, we observe that this strategy of repeated dumping can appear as the best repeated strategy when the demand equations are non-symmetric.eng
dc.description.sponsorshipWe thank LIAAD-INESC TEC, USP-UP project, Faculty of Sciences, University of Porto and Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. We acknowledge the financial support received by the ERDF – European Regional Development Fund through the Operational Programme for Competitiveness and Internationalisation – COMPETE 2020 Programme within project “POCI-01-0145-FEDER-006961”, and by National Funds through the FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology) within project UID/EEA/50014/ 2013 and ERDF (European Regional Development Fund) through the COMPETE Program (operational program for competitiveness) and by National Funds through the FCT within Project “Dynamics, optimization and modelling”, with reference PTDC/MAT-NAN/6890/2014. Alberto Pinto also acknowledges the financial support received through the Special Visiting Researcher Program (Bolsa Pesquisador Visitante Especial - PVE) “Dynamics, Games and Applications” with reference 401068/2014-5 (call: MEC/MCTI/CAPES/CNPQ/FAPS), at IMPA, Brazil. Part of this research was done during visits by the authors to IMPA (Brazil), University of São Paulo (Brazil), University of Warwick (United Kingdom), Institut Henri Poincaré (France) and SUNY (USA) who thank them for their hospitality.
dc.identifier.citationMartins, J., Banik, N., Pinto, A.A. (2016). A Repeated Strategy for Dumping. In: Alsedà i Soler, L., Cushing, J., Elaydi, S., Pinto, A. (eds) Difference Equations, Discrete Dynamical Systems and Applications. ICDEA 2012. Springer Proceedings in Mathematics & Statistics, vol 180. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-52927-0_11
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-662-52927-0_11
dc.identifier.isbn9783662529263
dc.identifier.isbn9783662529270
dc.identifier.issn2194-1009
dc.identifier.issn2194-1017
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.8/13705
dc.language.isoeng
dc.peerreviewedn/a
dc.publisherSpringer Berlin Heidelberg
dc.relation.ispartofSpringer Proceedings in Mathematics & Statistics
dc.relation.ispartofDifference Equations, Discrete Dynamical Systems and Applications
dc.rights.uriN/A
dc.titleA Repeated Strategy for Dumpingeng
dc.typeconference paper
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.citation.conferenceDate2016
oaire.citation.titleDifference Equations, Discrete Dynamical Systems and Applications (ICDEA 2012)
oaire.versionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
person.familyNameGouveia Martins
person.givenNameJosé Maria
person.identifier.orcid0000-0002-0556-7861
relation.isAuthorOfPublication29fc5be8-b5a2-489c-92d3-c0efe7e57892
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery29fc5be8-b5a2-489c-92d3-c0efe7e57892

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